24
to ratify it, France had placed her citizens in Burmah under the jurisdiction of British officials.
I pointed out to him the real state of the case, and reminded him that M. de Rochechouart's Supplementary Treaty had appeared to him quite as objectionable from a French as from an English point of view.
Your Lordship may observe that I did not feel precluded from going back to the Political Treaty in speaking to the Duc Decazes; and, in fact, there does not seem to be a necessity for treating it as absolutely beyond the reach of remonstrance, until we know that the ratifications of it have been actually exchanged. It is true that by obtaining from the Assembly a law authorizing them to ratify it, the Government have virtually pledged themselves to it; but in form the law does not itself constitute the ratification, it only authorizes the President of the Republic to ratify the Treaty if he thinks proper.
"
Inclosure in No. 8.
I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.
Projet de Note" in answer to Lord Lytton's communication of the Observations on a
15th November, 1874, respecting the Treaty between France and Annam.
THE Duc Decazes invited an opinion on this "Projet de Note.”
It has been already represented to his Excellency that an answer in the terms of this 'Projet' to the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government could not but be regarded by them as most unsatisfactory, and an earnest hope has been expressed that this matter, which may hereafter, if allowed to follow its present course, lead to such grave questions between the two countries, may receive further consideration at the hands of the French Government.
In addition to this general statement, it may perhaps be well to advert to some particular points in this "Projet."
It was represented in the English communication that this appeared to be the first instance in which one of the European Governments had departed from the wholesome rule heretofore observed, in accordance with which every nation represented in Chinese and Japanese waters has hitherto been content, as regards its interests in those waters, to act in concert with other nations, seeking no exclusive privileges for itself, but co-operating in the common interests to obtain equal rights for all.
seems to amount, in substance, to Projet" The answer given on this point in the " little more than that France stands in a peculiar position towards Annam; that she has purchased, by sacrifices on her side, the peculiar privileges she has arrogated to herself; and that, after all, the position of other nations with regard to commerce with Annam would be better under the Treaty than it would be without the Treaty.
This last allegation may well be questioned. It is true that the Treaty nominally opens certain ports of Annam to foreign commerce without distinction of flag or nationality; but its real purport seems to be to exclude other nations for ever from all commerce and all intercourse with Annam, except by the permission and under the control of French Agents, and under the disadvantage of different Customs duties in favour of a French Colony. It may certainly be doubtful whether, under the restraint thus imposed by the French Treaty upon Annam, the position of other nations would be as good as that in which they now stand, and in which they are free to form commercial relations with But that country, at their own time, by their own means, and upon equal terms. however this may be, it cannot be denied that this Treaty is based upon a principle the substitution of which for that on which European and American Governments have before acted in their negotiations with the countries of Eastern Asia would inevitably exercise a baneful influence not only on their relations with those countries, but also on their relations with each other.
On the special point of the differential export and import duties to be established by Annam in favour of the French Colony of Saigon, the proposed answer is that the trade of that Colony is not exclusively in French hands, and that ships of other nations might, by resorting thither, share the benefit of the reduced duties. It might be argued, on precisely the same grounds, that foreign nations would have no reason to feel aggrieved if France were to introduce into a Treaty with Italy an article binding the Italian Government to levy double duties upon all merchandize not passing through Marseilles.
The very important question of principle involved in the assumption by French agents of jurisdiction over British subjects in territory not French, is hardly touched upon in the
25
Projet. It is indeed suggested that the enforcement of this jurisdiction would probably, in practice, be of advantage to those over whom it would be exercised; but this is a point on which independent nations may reasonably insist upon judging for themselves. Certainly, in other cases in which an extra-territorial jurisdiction, independent of the local Sovereign, has been established, France, no less than other nations, has placed the jurisdiction over her citizens in the hands of agents of her own, not in those of the agents of a third Power. Great Britain, on her part, has at all times (as is stated in the English communication) maintained her rights, in virtue of which British Consuls, in places where extra-territorial jurisdiction exists, take cognizance of suits in which their countrymen are concerned, and she cannot be expected to allow that civil suits or criminal trials affecting British subjects can properly be submitted to the jurisdiction of a French Consul in a territory which is not French.
It is impossible to admit the correctness of the view taken in the Projet, that the engagement entered into between the Government of the Straits Settlement and the Chief of Perak in January 1874 can be compared with the proposed French Treaty with Annam. The engagement with Perak does not fetter commerce, impose differential duties in favour of a British colony, nor throw the entire control of the country into the hands of British officers.
It is to be feared that with regard to the points specially mentioned above, as well as in other respects, the proposed answer would not in any degree efface the painful impression made upon Her Majesty's Government, nor diminish the objections stated in the communication made under their instructions by Lord Lytton. It only remains, therefore, to repeat with earnestness the hope that the Treaty will be reconsidered by the French Government.
No. 9.
17.)
Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.--(Received February 17
(No. 150. Very Confidential.) My Lord,
IT would appear to result from the conversation of which a report is given in my
Paris, February 16, 1875. immediately preceding despatch No. 149 of to-day, that the Duc Decazes does not consider the Commercial Treaty between France and Annam as beyond the reach of amendment, and that he is desirous to remove the objections of Her Majesty's Government; but that he is more disposed to do this by a strained interpretation of the Treaty than by an actual alteration of the wording.
The interpretation the Duc Decazes puts upon the Treaty appears to me to be so forced, so entirely incompatible with the present wording, that I do not think it would be prudent to trust to effect being given to it, even if the Duke should himself be the French Foreign Minister when the question arose. If, however, a distinct clause were introduced stating that the intervention of the French officials in Annam should continue only so long as other nations made no Commercial Treaties with the country, and sent no officials of their own thither, the objections to the French Treaty would certainly be much lessened. I think, too, that some weight is to be given to the suggestion in the French draft answer, that it is absolutely necessary that first a considerable control should be exercised over Europeans resorting to Annam, in order to prevent conflicts with the Annamese authorities and other natives, to whom the presence of foreigners would be a novelty, and probably a distasteful novelty.
I must observe, however, that the Duc Decazes showed no disposition to give up the differential duties to be imposed in favour of Saigon. Nor can I conclude without reminding your Lordship that it has been apparent throughout the communications on this question, that the opinions of the Duc Decazes do not always prevail with the Department of Marine and Colonies, that this Department is wedded to the Treaties as they stand, and that it is apt to take its own line, without thinking it necessary to consult the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or even always to let him know what is about.
[81]
I have, &c.
(Signed)
LYONS.
H
205
24
to ratify it, France had placed her citizens in Burmah under the jurisdiction of British officials.
I pointed out to him the real state of the case, and reminded him that M. de Rochechouart's Supplementary Treaty had appeared to him quite as objectionable from a French as from an English point of view.
Your Lordship may observe that I did not feel precluded from going back to the Political Treaty in speaking to the Duc Decazes; and, in fact, there does not seem to be a necessity for treating it as absolutely beyond the reach of remonstrance, until we know that the ratifications of it have been actually exchanged. It is true that by obtaining from the Assembly a law authorizing them to ratify it, the Government have virtually pledged themselves to it; but in form the law does not itself constitute the ratification, it only authorizes the President of the Republic to ratify the Treaty if he thinks proper.
"
Inclosure in No. 8.
I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.
Projet de Note" in answer to Lord Lytton's communication of the Observations on a
15th November, 1874, respecting the Treaty between France and Annam.
THE Duc Decazes invited an opinion on this "Projet de Note.”
It has been already represented to bis Excellency that an answer in the terms of this 'Projet " to the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government could not but be regarded by them as most unsatisfactory, and an earnest hope has been expressed that this matter, which may hereafter, if allowed to follow its present course, lead to such grave questions between the two countries, may receive further consideration at the hands of the French Government.
In addition to this general statement, it may perhaps be well to advert to some particular points in this "Projet."
It was represented in the English communication that this appeared to be the first instance in which one of the European Governments had departed from the wholesome rule heretofore observed, in accordance with which every nation represented in Chinese and Japanese waters has hitherto been content, as regards its interests in those waters, to aet in concert with other nations, seeking no exclusive privileges for itself, but co-operating in the common interests to obtain equal rights for all.
seems to amount, in substance, to Projet " The answer given on this point in the " little more than that France stands in a peculiar position towards Annam; that she has purchased, by sacrifices on her side, the peculiar privileges she has arrogated to herself; and that, after all, the position of other nations with regard to commerce with Annam would be better under the Treaty than it would be without the Treaty.
This last allegation may well be questioned. It is true that the Treaty nominally opens certain ports of Annam to foreign commerce without distinction of flag or nationality; but its real purport seems to be to exclude other nations for ever from all commerce and all intercourse with Annam, except by the permission and under the control of French Agents, and under the disadvantage of different Customs duties in favour of a French Colony. It may certainly be doubtful whether, under the restraint thus imposed by the French Treaty upon Annam, the position of other nations would be as good as that in which they now stand, and in which they are free to form commercial relations with But that country, at their own time, by their own means, and upon equal terins. however this may be, it cannot be denied that this Treaty is based upon a principle the substitution of which for that on which European and American Governments have before acted in their negotiations with the countries of Eastern Asia would inevitably exercise a baneful influence not only on their relations with those countries, but also on their relations with each other.
On the special point of the differential export and import duties to be established by Annam in favour of the French Colony of Saigon, the proposed answer is that the trade of that Colony is not exclusively in French hands, and that ships of other nations might, by resorting thither, share the benefit of the reduced duties. It might be argued, on pre- cisely the same grounds, that foreign nations would have no reason to feel aggrieved if France were to introduce into a Treaty with Italy an article binding the Italian Govern ment to levy double duties upon all merchandize not passing through Marseilles.
The very important question of principle involved in the assumption by French agents of jurisdiction over British subjects in territory not French, is hardly touched upon in the
25
Projet. It is indeed suggested that the enforcement of this jurisdiction would probably, in practice, be of advantage to those over whom it would be exercised; but this is a point on which independent nations may reasonably insist upon judging for themselves. Certainly, in other cases in which an extra-territorial jurisdiction, independent of the local Sovereign, has been established, France, no less than other nations, has placed the jurisdiction over her citizens in the hands of agents of her own, not in those of the agents of a third Power. Great Britain, on her part, has at all times (as is stated in the English communication) maintained her rights, in virtue of which British Consuls, in places where extra-territorial jurisdiction exists, take cognizance of suits in which their countrymen are concerned, and she cannot be expected to allow that civil suits or criminal trials affecting British subjects can properly be submitted to the jurisdiction of a French Consul in a territory which is not French.
It is impossible to admit the correctness of the view taken in the Projet, that the engagement entered into between the Government of the Straits Settlement and the Chief of Perak in January 1874 can be compared with the proposed French Treaty with Annam. The engagement with Perak does not fetter commerce, impose differential duties in favour of a British colony, nor throw the entire control of the country into the hands of British officers.
It is to be feared that with regard to the points specially mentioned above, as well as in other respects, the proposed answer would not in any degree efface the painful impression made upon Her Majesty's Government, nor diminish the objections stated in the com- munication made under their instructions by Lord Lytton. It only remains, therefore, to repeat with earnestness the hope that the Treaty will be reconsidered by the French Government.
No. 9.
17.)
Lord Lyons to the Earl of Derby.--(Received February17
(No. 150. Very Confidential.) My Lord,
IT would appear to result from the conversation of fich a report is given in my
Faris, February 16, 1875. immediately preceding despatch N149 of to-day, that the Duc Decazes does not consider the Commercial Treaty between France and Annan as beyond the reach of amendment, and that he is desirous to remove the objections of Her Majesty's Government; but that he is more disposed to do this by a strained interpretation of the Treaty than by an actual alteration of the wording.
The interpretation the Due Decazes puts pon the Treaty appears to me to be so forced, so entirely incompatible with the present wording, that I do not think it would be prudent to trust to effect eing given to it, even if the Duke should himself be the French Foreign Minister when the question arose.ff, however, a distinct clause were introduced stating that the intervention of the French officials in Annam should continue only so long as other nations made Дo Commercial Treaties with the country, and sent no officials of their own thither, the objections to the French Treaty would certainly be much lessened. I think, too, that some weight is to be given to the suggestion in the French draft answer, that it is absolutely fecessary that first a considerable control should be exercised over Europeans resorting to Annam, in order to prevent conflicts with the Annamese authorities and other natives, to whom the presence of foreigners would be a novelty, and probably a distasteful novelty
I must observe, however, that the Duc Decazes showed no disposition to give up the differential duties to be imposed in favour of Saigon. Nor can I conclude without reminding your Lordship that it has been apparent throughout the communications on this question, that the opinions of the Duc Decazes do not always prevail with the Department of Marine and Colonies, that this Department is wedded to the Treaties as they stand, and that it is apt to take its own line, without thinking it necessary to consult the Minister for Foreign Affairs, or even always to let him know what is about.
[81]
I have, &c.
(Signed)
LYONS.
H
205
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